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In this paper, we study development in a panel of 87 countries from 1970 to 2005. We focus 
on characterizing institutionally driven heterogeneities in the development effects of 
macroeconomic policies and on comparing the development process as measured by GDP to 
that measured by the Human Development Index (HDI). We do so within a novel dynamic 
panel modelling framework that can account for crucial aspects of both the cross-sectional 
and intertemporal features of the observed process of development, and that can capture the 
dependence of the development effects of macroeconomic policies on differences in 
countries’ persistent characteristics, such as their institutions. Among our findings are that 
macroeconomic policies affect development with less delay than suggested by conventional 
econometric frameworks, yet impact HDI with longer delay and overall less strongly than 
GDP. Differences in countries’ persistent characteristics may even affect the sign of the long-
run development effects of a given macroeconomic policy: Fiscal stimuli in the form of 
government consumption expansions positively affect long-run GDP in countries with low 
institutional quality, but negatively affect long-run GDP in countries with high institutional 
quality. 
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Research aimed at understanding countries’ long-run economic development has
been a cornerstone of theoretical and empirical economic investigations for many
decades. While substantial progress has been made during the last couple of decades,
various issues remain controversially discussed or have received attention only re-
cently. Among these latter issues are (i) how the contributions of macroeconomic
development policies to advances in economic prosperity may depend on a country’s
persistent characteristics such as its institutions, (ii) how considering measures of
development other than income aﬀects development policy advice, and (iii) how to
ensure that estimates of development policy eﬀects take into account the speciﬁcs of
cross-country panel data. Taking up these issues in this paper, we study economic
development in a panel of 87 countries from 1970 to 2005. We investigate institu-
tionally driven heterogeneities in the development eﬀects of macroeconomic policies,
and compare the development process as measured by GDP to that measured by
the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI). We do so within a novel
dynamic panel modelling framework that can (i) account for crucial aspects of both
the cross-sectional and intertemporal features of the observed process of develop-
ment, and (ii) characterize a possible state dependence of the development eﬀects
of macroeconomic policies on diﬀerences in countries’ persistent characteristics such
as their institutions.
To motivate our panel modelling framework, it is useful to note that the predominant
investigative tool used in the empirical output growth literature continues to be the
“Barro regression”, in which a country’s rate of output growth during a certain time
period is regressed on an initial condition for the level of output and a variety of other
potential output growth determinants.1 There are a number of problems with the
Barro regression framework, however, which limit its usefulness for empirical analy-
sis.2 A ﬁrst issue casting doubt on the appropriateness of the default Barro regression
framework is that - random intercept eﬀects apart - all cross-country heterogeneities
of the output growth process are assumed to be fully captured by diﬀerent realiza-
1This regression framework has become popular in empirical work following the seminal paper
by Barro (1991).
2See also Hauk and Wacziarg (2009) for a recent discussion of econometric issues arising in
the empirical output growth literature. In this paper we take a diﬀerent perspective than Hauk
and Wacziarg (2009), however, by arguing in favor of a dynamic panel model-based inference
approach as being the appropriate means for the cross-country econometric analysis of economic
development.
1tions of the regression’s explanatory variables. This is, however, extremely unlikely
to be satisﬁed in practice, as due to ﬁnite sample size issues only a limited number
of explanatory variables - capturing only a small portion of the overall cross-country
heterogeneity - can be considered, and as many of the systematic diﬀerences pre-
vailing across countries are diﬃcult to observe or to measure. For this reason, Islam
(1995) and Evans (1996) were among the ﬁrst in the empirical output growth liter-
ature to consider panel ﬁxed eﬀects models, with the ﬁxed eﬀects accounting for all
time-invariant factors, including those that exhibit systematic (as opposed to purely
random) variation across countries. Pursuing this line of thought further, however,
countries’ systematically diﬀering societal characteristics are still unlikely to be fully
captured by incorporating ﬁxed eﬀects intercept terms, but would seem to require
also incorporating systematically varying slope coeﬃcients. As has been argued by
Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1997), assuming that the marginal eﬀects of development
policies are the same across countries when in fact they diﬀer, leads to serious falla-
cies in empirical inference. A second issue of concern with default Barro regressions
is that they are subject to endogeneity bias. Regressions of, say, output growth on
a variable such as the rate of investment in physical capital that a priori postulate
investment in physical capital to be exogenous may help to understand the strength
of the association of output growth with investment in physical capital, but cannot
provide evidence as to whether investment in physical capital is causal for output
growth. For purposes of policy analysis, it is clearly desirable, however, to work
with an econometric framework that can distinguish between correlates and causes
of economic growth.3 Third in terms of concerns with the default Barro regression
is that it does not feature a country-speciﬁc distinction between short- and long-run
dynamics, and is not designed to deal with the possible presence of unit roots in the
data and resulting issues of non-ergodicity (see Binder and Pesaran, 1999). Fourth
and ﬁnally, there is mounting evidence that the process of economic development
is subject to important nonlinearities, such as the dependence of the development
eﬀects of macroeconomic policies on country-speciﬁc conditions. Such nonlinearities
are not captured by default Barro regressions. See, for example, Rodr´ ıguez (2006)
and Binder, Georgiadis and Sharma (2011). Considering these four issues, there is
a clear need for empirical work on economic development to move beyond default
econometric techniques as typically used in the empirical output growth literature.
3We should mention that there has been important work tackling this endogeneity issue in
models that otherwise stick to the framework of Barro regressions. See, for example, Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001).
2Beyond giving careful consideration to empirical modelling issues, in this paper we
also go beyond an output-/income-only based analysis of the development process.
As prominently advocated by Sen (1999), the ultimate goal of economic development
policies should be to enhance the set of people’s opportunities. The empirical growth
literature to date has, however, primarily focused on investigating the determinants
of the long-run level of output per capita and its growth rate. While it is obviously
true that a higher level of output (income) can aﬀord an expanded set of consumption
goods, an exclusive focus on output might cloud other key aspects of the complete set
of opportunities available to individuals, as eminently described in the ﬁrst Human
Development Report in 1990:
First, national income ﬁgures, useful though they are for many purposes,
do not reveal the composition of income or the real beneﬁciaries. Second,
people often value achievements that do not show up at all, or not im-
mediately, in higher measured income or growth ﬁgures: Better nutrition
and health services, greater access to knowledge, more secure livelihoods,
better working conditions, security against crime and physical violence,
satisfying leisure hours, and a sense of participating in the economic,
cultural and political activities of their communities. Of course, people
also want higher incomes as one of their options. But income is not the
sum total of human life.
It therefore appears to be sensible to consider augmenting output as the sole mea-
sure of economic development by an alternative measure that shifts the focus of
development economics from solely output-oriented to human-life-oriented policy
design.4
Taking into account both the empirical modelling and data-measurement consider-
ations highlighted in the previous paragraphs, in this paper, then, we move beyond
a Barro regression based analysis of output growth. We take advantage of newly
compiled United Nations HDI data, and examine some key aspects of these (as well
as GDP) data within a novel dynamic panel modelling framework. In particular, we
adapt a panel autoregressive distributed lag model with state-dependent long-run
coeﬃcients, as proposed by Binder and Oﬀermanns (2007) as well as Binder, Geor-
giadis and Sharma (2011). The model introduced in these papers, in what follows
4We follow the lead of work in the United Nations Development Program, for example Gray
Molina and Purser (2010), in moving beyond an output-only based development analysis.
3referred to as the conditional pooled mean group (CPMG) state-dependent panel
model, appears to be strongly suited for the analysis of the determinants of GDP and
HDI, as it can capture crucial aspects of both the cross-sectional as well as intertem-
poral features of the GDP and HDI development processes, and can overcome the
problems associated with the Barro regression approach detailed above. In particu-
lar, the CPMG state-dependent panel model (i) features a country-speciﬁc distinc-
tion between short- and long-run dynamics, (ii) allows for systematic cross-country
heterogeneity in intercepts and slope coeﬃcients while also identifying features of
the development process that are common across countries, (iii) allows for the ex-
planatory variables to be endogenous, and (iv) remains applicable even when there
are unit roots in the data. Perhaps most importantly, however, the CPMG state-
dependent panel model allows us to investigate whether the development eﬀects of
changes in macroeconomic policies on HDI (GDP) vary across diﬀerent types of
institutional environments. Modelling the development eﬀects that macroeconomic
policies have on HDI (GDP) as a function of state variables measuring a country’s
institutions (with the state variables capturing that institutions typically are persis-
tent, yet, when appropriately aggregated, feature slow time variation), appears to be
a novel and promising way to reconcile a ﬁxed eﬀects empirical growth model with
an analysis of institutions and other societal characteristics as often emphasized in
analyses using the random eﬀects-based Barro regression framework.5 Our approach
to modelling state dependence of the development eﬀects of macroeconomic policies
involves determining how these eﬀects vary as a function of indices reﬂecting var-
ious of those aspects of countries’ institutions that in the recent empirical growth
literature have been found to robustly aﬀect economic development.
The plan for the remainder of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, we provide
some stylized facts about the HDI development process, contrasting it to that for
GDP. In Section 3, we discuss our panel modelling framework, putting emphasis
on how our model in a novel form captures both country ﬁxed eﬀects and the
cross-country variation of the development eﬀects of economic policies as a function
of countries’ institutional characteristics. We also discuss in Section 3 our state
variables measuring such institutional characteristics. In Section 4, we present our
main empirical results, contrasting these results to those we obtain for our data
from conventional Barro regressions. We conclude in Section 5, also indicating
some directions for future research. Several appendices provide details on data
5It is important to recall that in a ﬁxed eﬀects panel data model one cannot identify the eﬀects
of strictly time-invariant regressors.
4measurement and computational/econometric issues.
2 Some Stylized Facts About HDI Trends
We make use in this paper of newly compiled data on human development for a
large panel of countries. In particular, we use data on hybrid HDI for 87 countries
from 1970 to 2010.6 Table 1 provides a listing of all 87 countries that we consider
in this paper.7
In this section, we begin or data analysis by outlining some stylized facts about
trends in the cross-country HDI and GDP development processes.8 Figure 1 provides
the evolution of key ﬁrst and second moments of the cross-sectional distributions of
HDI for sub-sets of countries, and Figure 2 plots the evolutions of estimates of the
6While the United Nations for the 2010 Human Development Report introduced a change of
some of the variables and the method of aggregation employed in the calculation of HDI, in this
paper we use the hybrid HDI, which is based on the variables contained in the HDI data prior to
the 2010 Human Development Report, but aggregating these variables using geometric averages,
as per the aggregation methodology introduced in the 2010 Human Development Report. Our use
of hybrid HDI is motivated by data availability considerations. Denoting by lgdpit the logarithm
of GDP per capita in U.S. $ at purchasing power parity exchange rates, by lifeit life expectancy
at birth, by cgerit the combined gross school enrolment rate, and by literit the adult literacy rate,
the hybrid HDI is computed as follows:
hdiit = (gdpxit   lifexit   educxit)1/3, (1)
where
educxit = (cgerxit   literxit)
1/2, (2)
cgerxit = cgerit/115.82, (3)










7The composition of our sample is driven by our requirement (imposed to ensure adequate
reliability of our panel model estimates) that in order to incorporate a country in our sample, we
have at least 30 consecutive time-series observations available for all variables entering our panel
model. See Section 3 and Appendix A for further details.
8For this stylized facts analysis, we exploit the full time-series dimension of the newly compiled
UNDP data on HDI and GDP per capita, namely 1970 to 2010. For the remainder of the paper
we will need to drop observations after 2005, due to restrictions on the availability of some of the
additional variables we make use of in our panel model estimation, see Section 3.
5cross-sectional distributions themselves. When interpreting the plots of (the mo-
ments of) these distributions, it should be kept in mind that HDI and the logarithm
of GDP per capita may not be ergodic variables - that is, they may not converge
to time-invariant steady-state distributions, and their second moments may not be
well deﬁned (see Binder and Pesaran, 1999). With this caveat, Figures 1 and 2 indi-
cate that, not too surprisingly, throughout the sample period the OECD countries
have enjoyed the highest levels of human development followed by countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean, by countries in Asia and ﬁnally by countries in Africa.
Figure 1 also conveys that unconditional convergence of HDI with respect to initial
values has taken place, in the sense that HDI has grown stronger for less-developed
groupings of countries than for the OECD countries. The median of HDI in the
OECD countries from 1970 to 2010 rose by 17%, whereas it rose by 46% in Africa,
by 45% in Asia, and by 33% in Latin America and the Caribbean. Furthermore,
within each country group/region except for Africa, the standard deviation of the
cross-sectional distribution of HDI has decreased from 1970 to 2010: The standard
deviation for the OECD countries from 1970 to 2010 fell by 39%, for the Latin
American and Caribbean countries by 30%, and for the Asian countries by 18%,
whereas it rose for the African countries by 44%.
Analogously to Figures 1 and 2 for HDI, Figures 3 and 4 present the evolution of
key ﬁrst and second moments of the cross-sectional distributions of the logarithm
of GDP per capita and the evolutions of estimates of the cross-sectional distribu-
tions themselves. Comparing Figure 3 for the logarithm of GDP per capita with
Figure 1 for HDI, three observations stand out: First, while all regions have expe-
rienced notable improvements in HDI from 1970 to 2010, this is not the case for
the logarithm of GDP per capita, as the mean and median of African countries’
GDP per capita have not grown in comparable magnitude as the OECD, Asian as
well as Latin American and Caribbean countries’ mean and median. Second, for
the Latin American and Caribbean as well as African countries’ mean and median,
the unconditional convergence to OECD development levels apparently present in
the evolution of the mean and median of HDI does not appear to be present for the
logarithm of GDP per capita. The median of the logarithm of GDP per capita in the
OECD countries from 1970 to 2010 rose by 8%, also rising by 8% in Latin America
and the Caribbean, by 1% in Africa, yet by 16% in Asia.9 Third, while for HDI
9The average annual growth rate of the level of GDP per capita in the OECD countries from
1970 to 2010 amounted to 1.9%, to 1.7% in Latin America and the Caribbean, to 0.2% in Africa,
and to 3.2% in Asia.
6countries within a given region appear to unconditionally converge to a common
long-run level (with the exception of Africa countries), a long-term decline of the
within-region standard deviations is absent for the logarithm of GDP per capita,
with the exception of the Asian countries. The region/country group standard de-
viation rose by 2% for the OECD, by 13% for Latin America and the Caribbean,
and by 18% for Africa; only for Asia it declined by 20%.10
Comparison of the estimates of the cross-sectional distributions of HDI (in Figure
2) and the logarithm of GDP per capita (in Figure 4) further illustrates the relative
strength of the unconditional convergence patterns. Unconditional convergence for
HDI is apparent for the OECD countries, Asia as well as Latin America and the
Caribbean; but tends to be absent for the logarithm of GDP per capita.
Finally in terms of stylized facts for our data, Figure 5 provides scatter plots of the
HDI levels in 2010 against the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2010, of the 1970 to
2010 changes in HDI against GDP per capita growth rates during this time period,
and scatter plots of the change in (growth of) HDI (GDP per capita) between 1970
and 2010 against initial HDI (logarithm of GDP per capita) in 1970. Still keeping in
mind the caveat that HDI and GDP per capita may not be ergodic variables, there is
a strong positive correlation (with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.97) between the levels
of HDI and of the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2010. The relationship between
the 1970 to 2010 change of HDI and the growth rate of GDP per capita during
the same time period also is positive, though with a slope only about half as large
as for the corresponding levels relationship. While there appears to be a negative,
statistically signiﬁcant, relationship between the initial level of HDI in 1970 and the
change of HDI between 1970 and 2010, pointing to the presence of unconditional
convergence for HDI, the same does not appear to be the case for GDP per capita.
As remarkable as some of these stylized facts concerning convergence are, to move
beyond a simplistic graphical and regression analysis inter alia not involving any
form of conditioning on country-speciﬁc characteristics and failing to account for
the possible lack of ergodicity of the levels of HDI and GDP per capita, we turn to
our panel-econometric analysis.
10For a more detailed investigation of (unconditional) convergence of HDI and its components,
see Mayer-Foulkes (2010).
73 Econometric Model
We consider a panel autoregressive distributed lag model, where in departure from
a heterogenous dynamic panel data model such as the one in Lee, Pesaran and
Smith (1997) we allow the key slope coeﬃcients to be state dependent, varying as a
function of a (pre-determined) conditioning state variable, zi,t−1:
yit =  i + ϕi   t +
p  
k=1






ik(zi,t−1)   xi,t−k + ǫit, t = r,r + 1,...,T, (7)
where yit denotes the dependent variable of country i at time t (hdiit or lgdpit),  i
and ϕi denote ﬁxed eﬀects intercept and time-trend terms, xit denotes an m × 1
vector of explanatory variables, ρik(zi,t−1) and ̺′
ik(zi,t−1) denote state-dependent





, i.i.d. across t, and with the disturbance terms in addition being independent
across i.11
The principal idea underlying our consideration of a model with state-dependent
slope coeﬃcients is as follows: In the Barro regression framework, the eﬀects of
time-invariant variables on the dependent variable are identiﬁed by restricting the
country-speciﬁc eﬀects to be random (rather than ﬁxed) eﬀects, imposing orthogo-
nality between the country-speciﬁc eﬀects and the model’s other regressors, includ-
ing those in xit. As discussed in the Introduction, such a random eﬀects restriction
for cross-country models in empirical practice is rather implausible, as many of
the time-invariant aspects of development that together enter the country-speciﬁc
eﬀects vary systematically (not just randomly) across countries. It thus seems im-
perative to allow for ﬁxed-eﬀects intercepts, as we have in our speciﬁcation of the
 i’s in Equation (7). Of course, having introduced such ﬁxed-eﬀects intercepts, it
is no longer possible to identify the eﬀects of any other regressors that are strictly
time-invariant. Our conditioning states, the zi,t−1’s, represent indices composed of
variables that reﬂect similar aspects of a country’s institutions. Carefully designing
11For ease of exposition we assume in Equation (7) that all explanatory variables enter with
the same lag order and that the time-series dimension is the same for all countries, involving
observations for yit, xit and zit for t = 0,1,...,T. In our empirical work, we allow for variable-
and country-speciﬁc lag orders pi and qik, for k = 1,2,...,m and i = 1,2,...,N, as well as for an
unbalanced panel of observations.
8the composition of each index variable, we ensure that our zi,t−1’s feature suﬃcient
(if relatively small) time variation. Our model thus overcomes the random eﬀects
restriction of the Barro regression framework, without having to pass on examining
the quantitative importance of various elements of a country’s institutions.12
The error-correction representation of Equation (7), explicitly separating short- and
long-run dynamics, is given by:
∆yit =  i + ϕi   t + αi(zi,t−1)   yit−1 + β
′
i(zi,t−1)   xi,t−1 + ψ
′
i(zi,t−1)   hit + ǫit

















































Given the relatively limited number of time-series observations typically available
in cross-country development panel data sets such as the one we use for this paper,
we need to restrict the degree of parameter variation allowed for by the model
in Equation (8). To this end, we specify the speed of adjustment and the other
model short-run dynamics as varying in unrestricted form across countries, but as
not varying with zi,t−1. Also introducing the weak conditional (or state-dependent)
pooling restriction that countries that share the same values of the conditioning
state variables also share the same long-run multipliers, θi(zi,t−1) = θ(zi,t−1),13 we
12Due to reasons of model parsimony, we will not consider model speciﬁcations allowing for more
than one conditioning state variable at a time, and will examine the inﬂuence of our conditioning
state variables in sequential form, one state variable at a time. See Binder, Georgiadis and Sharma
(2011) for a model featuring the simultaneous presence of multiple state variables.
13The restriction that θi(zi,t−1) = θ(zi,t−1), i = 1,2,...,N, is obviously much weaker than the
unconditional pooling restriction of Barro regressions and ﬁxed-eﬀects panel data models (that
involves all slope coeﬃcients), and also is signiﬁcantly weaker still than the unconditional long-run
pooling restriction of the pooled mean group model of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999), namely
θi(zi,t−1) = θ, i = 1,2,...,N. See Binder and Oﬀermanns (2007) and Binder, Georgiadis and
9then have the conditional pooled mean group (CPMG) panel data model
∆yit =  i + ϕi   t + αi   yi,t−1 + β
′
i(zi,t−1)   xi,t−1 + ψ
′
i   hit + ǫit
=  i + ϕi   t + αi  
 
yi,t−1 − θ




i   hit + ǫit. (9)
In this framework featuring conditional or state-dependent long-run homogeneity,
all transitional dynamics are fully country-speciﬁc, and the long-run dynamics are
homogeneous only for countries sharing the same conditioning states. Note that
this framework thus allows the long-run multipliers to diﬀer across countries, but
also to diﬀer over time for a given country, with variations in the conditioning state
variable. Clearly, such a panel modelling framework cannot be a free lunch: For the
model to be reliably estimable, the number of variables in xit has to be limited, and
the time-series dimension available for each country cannot be too small. Keeping
these restrictions in mind, there are numerous advantages of the panel modelling
framework of Equation (9) for the analysis of the development eﬀects of economic
policies, speciﬁcally also when compared to Barro regressions, with a typical such
Barro regression given by:
T
−1   (yiT − yi0) = β0 + β1   yi0 + γ
′   xi + δ
′   zi + viT. (10)
The advantages of our state-dependent dynamic panel data model in Equation (9)
compared to the Barro regression framework in Equation (10) stem from the facts
that the model in Equation (9)
(i) is a model with country-speciﬁc dynamics, with lag orders chosen on the basis
of model selection criteria, unlike for Equation (10), where limited common
dynamics across countries are imposed on the data a priori;
(ii) allows for ﬁxed-eﬀects intercepts and time trends,  i and ϕi, whereas the model
in Equation (10) only allows for random-eﬀects intercepts (as part of viT);
(iii) allows for ﬁxed-eﬀects type (systematically varying) short-run slope coeﬃ-
cients, αi and ψi, as well as long-run coeﬃcients θ(zi,t−1) that in general are
identical only for the same realizations of the state variables, zi,t−1, whereas
Sharma (2011) for previous empirical evidence in the context of exchange rate and output growth
dynamics that the weak conditional (state-dependent) long-run pooling restriction we consider here
still sizeably increases the eﬃciency of parameter estimates compared to country-speciﬁc time-series
analyses based mean group estimates.
10the model in Equation (10) imposes full (cross-sectional and intertemporal)
invariance of the slope coeﬃcients in β1, γ and δ;
(iv) allows for cross-sectionally heteroskedastic disturbance term variances, whereas
the disturbance term variance under the model in Equation (10) is typically
assumed to be cross-sectionally homoskedastic;
(v) allows for non-linear (interaction) terms in zi,t−1 and xit−1, whereas the model
in Equation (10) is fully linear.
In terms of capturing essential aspects of the HDI and GDP development processes,
these modelling features result in the following:
(i) We can capture high degrees of cross-country heterogeneity both concerning
the short- and long-run parameters, while also capturing common long-run
features prevailing under the same state variable values. In our model set-up,
unlike in the set-up of the Barro regression, the long-run development eﬀects
of changes in economic policies can vary across countries that feature diﬀering
institutions. Our model in Equation (9) allows us to investigate this state
variable dependence through ﬂexible-form functionals, for example Chebyshev
polynomials. As we will document in Section 4, empirically the size of the
cross-country variation of these long-run eﬀects can be large, implying that
policy recommendations based on Barro regressions for numerous countries
will be subject to a “one size ﬁts all” fallacy. As we will also document
in Section 4, the speed with which countries’ long-run development paths are
reached after a change in economic policy can exhibit non-trivial cross-country
variation as well. Barro regressions by construction cannot capture this feature
of the data, leading to mis-assessment concerning the time horizon required for
the development eﬀects of changes in economic policies to reach their long-run
levels.
(ii) Our model in Equation (9) can eﬀectively deal with potential endogeneity of
the explanatory variables in xit, thus allowing us to measure causal eﬀects
of changes in our policy variables, as opposed to bi-directional correlations
between these policy variables and HDI (GDP). To expand upon this point,
consider for illustrative purposes a simpliﬁed special case of the model in Equa-
tion (7):
yit =  i + ϕi   t + ρi(zi,t−1)   yi,t−1 + ̺i(zi,t−1)   xit + ǫit. (11)
11Suppose that xit is correlated with ǫit:
xit = γi + δi   t + κi   xi,t−1 + uit, (12)
with Cov(ǫit,uit) = σǫu,i  = 0. Clearly, the least squares estimator of the coeﬃ-
cients in Equation (11) will then be subject to an endogeneity bias. As noted
by Pesaran and Shin (1999), a great appeal of the autoregressive distributed
lag model structure in Equation (11) is that this endogeneity can be readily
overcome without needing to resort to instrumental variables estimation. To





  uit + ξit, (13)
where by construction Cov(ξit,uit) = 0. Substituting from Equation (12) into





  (xit − κi   xi,t−1 − γi − δi   t) + ξit. (14)
Substituting from Equation (14) into Equation (11), we obtain a model with
an augmented lag structure, involving the additional regressor xi,t−1, but in
which neither xit nor xi,t−1 can cause an endogeneity bias and would thus
require instrumentation, as Cov(ξit,uit) = Cov(ξit,ui,t−1) = 0.
Before turning to the discussion of our empirical results, let us conclude this section
by discussing our choices for the model variables, y, x, and z. For y, we choose
hdi or lgdp;14 in x, we include a set of variables that can be interpreted as cap-
turing or reﬂecting diﬀerent types of economic policies aimed at improving human
development (stimulating output), namely the logarithm of per capita government
consumption (lgov, reﬂecting aspects of ﬁscal policy), the logarithm of per capita
(private plus public) investment in physical capital (linv, reﬂecting both aspects of
ﬁscal policy and various policy incentives for private sector saving and investment),
as well as the logarithm of per capita imports plus exports (lopen, reﬂecting vari-
ous policy measures to stimulate international trade).15 See, for example, Binder,
Georgiadis and Sharma (2011) for a review of some of the theoretical growth lit-
14See Section 2.
15An price stability-based measure of monetary policy turned out to be insigniﬁcant across all
model speciﬁcations, and we thus do not report on it further in this paper.
12erature discussing the mechanisms through which our three x variables may aﬀect
long-run development, speciﬁcally GDP. Compared to much of the empirical output
growth literature, our x vector contains a notably smaller number of regressors. We
allow for additional variables that often get consideration as further regressors in
Barro regression based analyses to enter through two other aspects of our model:
(i) the country-speciﬁc ﬁxed-eﬀects intercepts and time trends, and (ii) the set of
conditioning variables z capturing the state dependence of the long-run development
eﬀects of changes in government consumption, in investment in physical capital as
well as trade openness. As variables entering the set of conditioning state variables,
we consider an index of the quality of (public sector) governance (govqual), and,
as reﬂecting portions of the equality provided by a country’s institutions, of gender
inequality (geninq).16 17 To measure the quality of (public) sector governance, we
use the dynamic state-space model based index from Binder and Georgiadis (2010)
with the component variables corruption, law and order, bureaucracy quality, in-
vestment proﬁle and internal conﬂict, all drawn from the Political Risk Services
Group’s International Country Risk Guide. See Binder and Georgiadis (2010) for
further details on this index. As an illustration, Figure 6 provides the 2005 quality
of governance ranking sorted from highest (Finland) to lowest (Democratic Republic
of Congo) levels of quality of governance (the higher the index value, the higher the
quality and the lower the risk associated with a country’s public sector governance).
Motivating our second index, gender inequality, considerable concern has been ex-
pressed in the development economics literature about the role societal inequality
may play as an obstacle to human development progressing to its potential; see, for
example, the Human Development Report 1995. In this paper, we measure gender
inequality on the basis of (i) the diﬀerence between the ratio of a country’s female
to male gross enrolment in primary schooling and the grand cross-country average
of this ratio, and of (ii) the diﬀerence between the ratio of a country’s female to
male life expectancy and the grand cross-country average of this ratio. Excluding
females from access to education induces a gender bias due to the ensuing unequal
distribution of human capital in the population; relative life expectancy of females
16We abandoned attempts to also consider an index of the development conduciveness of the
religious environment (due to issues of lack of robustness of results and concerns as to whether
such conduciveness might not poorly proxy for a measure of societal trust), and an index of income
inequality (due to a lack of observations covering suﬃciently long time intervals for a reasonably
large number of countries in the United Nations’ WIDER database).
17See, for example, Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson (2005) and Rodrik, Subramanian and
Trebbi (2004) for contributions stressing the role of institutions for a country’s economic develop-
ment.
13compared to males is an indicator for gender bias, as it is critically inﬂuenced by
gender bias in health care and nutrition.18 As an illustration, Figure 7 provides
the gender inequality ranking for 2005, sorted from the lowest (Iran) to the highest
(Niger) degree of observed such inequality (that is, the higher the index value for
gender inequality, the more successful a country has been in moving towards gender
equality of its institutions). See Appendix B for further details concerning the mea-
surement of our state indices. As the state dependence of economic policies that we
model in Equation (9) concerns long-run dependence, for each of the conditioning
state indices we extract the underlying long-run evolution using a recursive Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁlter as detailed in Appendix B.3. For the conditioning functional, we work
with ﬁrst-order Chebyshev polynomials, so that
θℓ(zi,t−1) = θℓ0 + θℓ1   zi,t−1, (15)
with ℓ = 1,2.19 For us to incorporate a country in our sample,we require that there
are at least 30 consecutive time-series observations available for the dependent, all
explanatory and all conditioning state variables. Table 1 provides a list of the
N = 87 countries that we can thus include in our sample. See Appendix A for
further details concerning the measurement of our y and x variables.
4 Empirical Findings
As motivated in detail in Section 3, we present estimation results and their substan-
tive economic implications for two models:
For the set of Barro regression models20
T
−1   (yiT − yi0) = β0 + β1   yi0 + γ1   govgdpi + γ2   invgdpi + γ3   opengdpi
+δ1   govquali + δ2   geninqi + viT, (16)
18See Sen (2001) for a more thorough discussion.
19While we also considered higher-order Chebyshev polynomials introducing yet richer forms of
nonlinearities, for reasons of model parsimony we decided to restrict ourselves in this paper to
ﬁrst-order polynomial speciﬁcations.
20The regressors in Equation (16) except for yi0 are intertemporal averages over the sample
period.
14where yit is hdiit or lgdpit,21 govqualit reﬂects quality of governance, and geninqit
gender inequality, and for the set of CPMG state-dependent panel models
∆yit =  i + ϕi   t + αi  
 
yi,t−1 − θ1(zi,t−1)   lgovi,t−1 − θ2(zi,t−1)   linvi,t−1




i   hit + ǫit, (17)
where yit is again hdiit or lgdpit, and zit is one of govqualit, or geninqit.22 See Section
3 for a description of all the variables, and a deﬁnition of the short-run dynamics,
which for ease of notation in Equation (17) again are captured through elements of
hit.
Tables 2 and 3 provide the coeﬃcient estimates as well as implied speed of conver-
gence coeﬃcients for the Barro regression model.23 There are two main dimensions
of results for the Barro regression model: The speed of convergence to the steady
state and the quantitative role of the various development determinants. With re-
spect to the speed of convergence, the implied half-life for GDP for our sample is
longer than reported in some of the previous literature (for example Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 2004), but shorter than implied by the results in Gray Molina and Purser
(2010).24 The half-lifes tend to be signiﬁcantly longer for HDI than for GDP, with
the half-life of GDP in the model including the complete set of regressors being about
50% shorter than that for HDI. With respect to the development determinants, for
the regressors capturing or reﬂecting macroeconomic policies, investment in physical
capital enters all Barro regressions with a positive sign. Government consumption
has both economically and statistically about zero eﬀect on HDI, but aﬀects GDP
negatively (as also in Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004), though not in a statistically
signiﬁcant manner. Trade openness is economically and statistically insigniﬁcant
(with a negative sign) in all regressions where HDI is the dependent variable, but
enters (though not statistically signiﬁcant) with a positive sign whenever GDP is
the dependent variable. The variables reﬂecting institutional characteristics - qual-
21To stay as close as possible to the typical formulation of Barro regressions in the empirical
growth literature, government consumption, investment in physical capital and imports plus ex-
ports enter Equation (16) as ratios relative to GDP, that is, govgdpi = T −1  T
t=1 exp(lgovit −
lgdpit), invgdpi = T −1  T
t=1 exp(linvit −lgdpit), and opengdpi = T −1  T
t=1 exp(lopenit −lgdpit).
22Note the distinctions between the deﬁnitions of the regressors in the Barro regression model
in Equation (16) and the CPMG state-dependent panel data model in Equation (17).
23See Appendix C for a derivation of the length of the half-lifes implied by Equations (16) and
(17).
24Some of the half-lifes implied by the Gray Molina and Purser (2010) regressions are diﬃcult
to interpret, as they involve the initial level of the logarithm of GDP per capita even when the
dependent variable is HDI.
15ity of governance and gender inequality25 - have signiﬁcant eﬀects only in the GDP
model. Generally, according to the Barro regressions, investment in physical capital
is the most robust determinant of both human development and output growth.
Quality of governance, the initial condition and possibly gender inequality matter
in statistically signiﬁcant form for long-run GDP development, but not for that of
HDI. Stronger governance and more equal gender opportunities spur output growth,
and there is conditional convergence in terms of GDP of poorer countries towards
richer ones.
Let us turn to the estimation results for our CPMG state-dependent panel model. As
for the Barro regressions, we begin with commenting on the speeds of convergence to
steady state. In Tables 4 and 5 we provide the means and medians of the country-
speciﬁc speed of adjustment parameter estimates for our two dependent and two
conditioning state variables. For example, when choosing governance quality as the
conditioning state variable and HDI as the dependent variable (left results column of
Table 4), the average speed of adjustment of the 24 OECD countries in our sample is
-0.25. The half-lifes obtained from the CPMG state-dependent panel model across
the board are much shorter than those obtained from the Barro regressions. To
give just a couple of examples: For HDI, under the Barro regression the half-life,
though depending on the details of the model speciﬁcation, is at least 86 years, but
under the CPMG state-dependent panel model falls to two to three years. For the
logarithm of GDP per capita, under the Barro regression, the half-life is at least 47
years, but is down to no more than 15 months under the CPMG state-dependent
panel model. As our panel model is designed to ﬁlter out country-speciﬁc short-
run dynamics, this result is not due to confusing short- with long-run dynamics,
but rather a consequence of the fact that our panel model captures both short- and
long-run cross-country heterogeneities, and is capturing the adjustment dynamics to
the conditional, country-speciﬁc, long-run equilibrium. The adjustment dynamics
are rather similar across our two indices capturing state dependence, quality of
governance and gender inequality. The GDP adjustment processes for both state
variables tend to be fastest for Sub-Saharan Africa and the LDCs, and (relatively)
slowest for the Asian and OECD countries. For HDI, the half-lifes tend to be shortest
for Latin America and the Caribbean, and relatively longest for Sub-Saharan Africa
and the LDCs. Overall, however, there is limited variation of the half-lifes across
conditioning states and/or country groups. As is clear from the strikingly diﬀerent
25Recall that the higher the index value for gender inequality, the more successful a country has
been in moving towards gender equality.
16half-lifes implied by the Barro regression model, this does not imply that cross-
country heterogeneities would not be an important consideration for development
questions. Rather, the CPMG state-dependent panel model eﬀectively ﬁlters out
cross-country heterogeneities, and the half-life results indicate that for our sample
the speeds of convergence to country-speciﬁc long-run equilibria are fast, rendering
the heterogeneity in half-lifes a matter of several months only, which in a growth
context is relatively negligible.
Concerning the estimated long-run multiplier functionals for the CPMG state-dependent
panel model, displayed in Figures 8 and 9, several observations stand out.26 The
ﬁgures, most pronouncedly so for GDP, but on a diminished scale also for HDI, indi-
cate strong state dependence of the development eﬀects of economic policy changes,
as the estimated long-run coeﬃcient functionals exhibit sizeable variation across
diﬀerent values of the conditioning state variables. The degree of state dependence
highlights the cost of (erroneously) imposing cross-country homogeneity of the long-
run development eﬀects of changes in economic policy. Turning to speciﬁc policy
variables and conditioning state variables, let us consider ﬁrst the results when con-
ditioning the long-run multiplier on quality of governance. The sign of the long-run
eﬀect of a government consumption stimulus for both HDI and GDP changes as
the quality of governance increases suﬃciently. For countries with low institutional
quality, government consumption stimuli positively aﬀect long-run HDI and GDP,
but for countries with high institutional quality, the long-run development eﬀects
are negative.27 The scope of ﬁscal policy in the form of government consumption
is much more limited for countries in which the quality of governance is high. On
the other hand, strong scores on quality of governance strengthen the long-run de-
velopment eﬀects both of investment in physical capital and of trade, both for HDI
and GDP. Taken together, the government consumption and physical capital invest-
ment eﬀects suggest that while government consumption expenditure in countries
with strong quality of governance is not a suitable vehicle for long-run growth, a
diﬀerent assessment may hold for government investment expenditure. Moving to
our estimation results when the conditioning state index is gender inequality, the
variations of the long-run multiplier functionals for GDP occur on an overall more
compact scale when compared with the corresponding functionals under quality of
26For space reasons, we omit tables with the complete sets of coeﬃcient estimates for the CPMG
state-dependent panel model. The tables are available from the authors upon request.
27Such negative eﬀects could be due to interest rate eﬀects or distortionary tax schemes, for
example.
17governance conditioning. The slopes of the long-run multiplier functionals still sug-
gest that as a country improves upon its gender equal opportunity score, stimuli to
investment in physical capital and to trade openness bring about stronger output
growth. The magnitude of state variation of the HDI development eﬀects implied
by economic policy changes is of about the same magnitude when conditioning on
gender inequality as when conditioning on the quality of governance. The strongest
variation is observed for the long-run HDI eﬀects of changes in investment in phys-
ical capital. Strong scores on gender equal opportunity strengthen the long-run
development eﬀects of investment in physical capital.
Exploiting the rich dynamic structure of our CPMG state-dependent panel model,
we next compute dynamic multipliers depicting the full adjustment paths of HDI
and of GDP per capita in response to a permanent ten percentage points increase in
one of the economic policy variables. We compare the dynamic multipliers obtained
from our CPMG state-dependent panel model with the time path of the eﬀect of
the corresponding economic policy variable change in period t = 0 obtained from
the Barro regression model.28 See Appendix D.1 (D.2) for the calculation of the
dynamic multiplier in the Barro regression (in the CPMG state-dependent panel)
model. The dynamic multipliers in Figure 11 display for all 87 countries in our
sample the percentage change of HDI and of GDP per capita in response to a ten
percentage points increase in one of the economic policy variables. To structure
the large number of multipliers we compute, we assigned countries to one of three
clusters, based on the average values of the conditioning state variables governance
quality and gender inequality, and with the clusters constructed to create relatively
homogenous country groupings. We assign each country to one of the three clusters:
Cluster 1 containing all countries scoring well below average on gender inequality
and at most average on governance quality; Cluster 2 containing all countries scoring
in the extended medium range of values for governance quality and close to average
or better on gender inequality; and Cluster 3 ﬁnally containing all countries scoring
at least in the 80% percentile on governance quality (all these countries happen to
have an average or higher score on gender inequality). See Figure 10 for a graphi-
cal illustration that these three clusters naturally emerge when considering our two
state variables governance quality and gender inequality, and Table 6 for a listing
28It is certainly sensible to argue that changes in, say, government consumption expenditure will
in general also induce changes in, say, trade openness. Nevertheless, as here we wish to emphasize
the comparison between dynamic adjustments as can be computed for the Barro regression model
and those implied by the CPMG state-dependent panel model, we compute orthogonal dynamic
multipliers based on changes in a single policy variable only.
18of the countries within these three clusters. Each dynamic multiplier trajectory in
Figure 11 corresponds to the average trajectory across the two conditioning state
variables governance quality and gender inequality: For each of these two condition-
ing states, we trace the in-sample eﬀects of a period t = 0 (ten percent) increase
of the x variable in question if the two conditioning state variables had evolved
as they actually did in sample.29 The Barro regression based multipliers are, of
course, state invariant. The left column in Figures 11 and 12 depicts the dynamic
multipliers for all three clusters and all three economic policy variables under HDI
being the dependent variable, and the right column depicts the dynamic multipliers
under the logarithm of GDP per capita being the dependent variable. In each panel,
the solid lines depict dynamic multipliers obtained from the CPMG state-dependent
panel model in Equation (17), and the starred lines depict the dynamic multipliers
implied by the Barro regression model in Equation (16). Figure 11 depicts for the
CPMG state-dependent panel model the dynamic multipliers separately for each
country within a given cluster, whereas Figure 12 displays the averages of these
dynamic multipliers across all countries in a given cluster. Finally in Figure 12, the
dash-dot line depicts the long-run eﬀects as implied by the CPMG state-dependent
panel model. Several observations stand out upon inspection of Figures 11 and 12.
First, there is considerable heterogeneity across clusters in both the short- and the
long-run eﬀects of the policy changes implied by the CPMG state-dependent panel
model, speciﬁcally of the GDP eﬀects, but within a diminished scale also of the
HDI eﬀects. As just one example, for countries in Cluster 3, the logarithm of GDP
per capita after an increase in investment in physical capital in both the short and
long run grows about twice as much as for countries in Cluster 1. The heterogene-
ity of the dynamic multipliers in part reﬂects, of course, the state dependence of
the long-run coeﬃcient functionals discussed earlier in this section. It also reﬂects
that all coeﬃcients driving the short-run dynamics in the CPMG state-dependent
panel model are allowed to be country-speciﬁc. Cross-country heterogeneity is also
prominently present in the dynamic multipliers reﬂecting the GDP eﬀects of a gov-
ernment consumption stimulus: While the average long-run eﬀects are negative for
Cluster 3, they are positive for Clusters 1 and 2. At the same time, for a number of
countries in Clusters 1 and 2 the short-run government consumption stimulus eﬀects
are larger in magnitude than the long-run eﬀects. Even in countries with limited
29As the dynamic multipliers for our CPMG panel model are state dependent, there are other
possibilities also to compute dynamic multipliers, including integrating out the state dependence.
See Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) for a general discussion in the time-series context.
19governance quality, therefore, the development scope of government consumption
stimuli is limited. Second, the policy eﬀects on HDI implied by the CPMG state-
dependent panel model generally tend to be quantitatively, but in some instances
also qualitatively, diﬀerent from those on GDP. For example, while an increase in
investment in physical capital leads to a signiﬁcant gain in the logarithm of GDP
per capita across all clusters, the same stimulus across all clusters at best has a
small positive long-run eﬀect on HDI. Third, both the short- and the long-run de-
velopment eﬀects in the CPMG state-dependent panel model are generally diﬀerent
from the corresponding eﬀects in the Barro regression model, not least because the
Barro model features homogenous eﬀects across all countries and linear adjustment
processes. Only for speciﬁc cases are the multiplier eﬀects implied by the Barro
regression model similar to the average multiplier eﬀects implied by the CPMG
state-dependent panel model. In general, even if one is interested in average ef-
fects across certain institutional characteristics, these cannot be well measured by
a model neglecting heterogeneities. This is perhaps most strikingly observed for
the development eﬀects of policies aimed at increasing trade openness: The CPMG
state-dependent panel model predicts that an increase in trade openness on average
across our three clusters spurs the long-run value of HDI rather strongly (at least
among the macroeconomic policies we consider), and also spurs the long-run value of
GDP. According to the Barro model, on the other hand, increasing trade openness
is not beneﬁcial for HDI and of small value for GDP.
Tables 7 and 8 focus on the eﬀects of the various economic policy changes depicted
in Figures 11 and 12, with Table 7 providing the development eﬀects after 20 years,
and Table 8 providing these eﬀects in the steady state.30 The two tables highlight
some commonalities in the development eﬀects of changes in our three economic
policy variables. Stimuli in investment in physical capital and in trade openness
across all three country clusters have positive long-horizon eﬀects on GDP. Also, in-
creased trade openness across all three clusters also has positive long-horizon eﬀects
on HDI. For government consumption stimuli, as noted earlier, state conditioning
plays a pronounced role, in that the long-horizon HDI and GDP eﬀects of such stim-
uli diminish and turn negative with advances in governance quality and/or gender
equality, as underlying the construction of our three clusters. The Barro regression
model seems to overstate the extent to which government consumption stimuli may
have detrimental long-term GDP development eﬀects.
30Table 8 also lists the steady state eﬀects implied by the Barro regression models that were not
plotted in Figures 11 and 12.
20Let us ﬁnally discuss the relation between our ﬁndings in this section and those in
Section 2. In Section 2, we had presented (see in particular Figures 1, 3 and 5) what
appeared to be evidence that HDI would exhibit unconditional convergence features
not present in GDP. In this section, however, we found evidence that countries’ long-
run development paths are state dependent, and that the conditional convergence
process for HDI tends to be much more drawn-out than that for GDP. Tables 9
and 10 indicate a likely source for this apparent discrepancy of ﬁndings: HDI and
GDP appear to be unit root processes. Both country-speciﬁc unit root testing and
panel unit root testing (at least when cross-sectional dependence is captured) does
suggest so. The (popular) moment analysis and regression methods we employed
in Section 2 are not valid in the presence of a unit root: Bounded second moments
then do not exist, and a regression of the level of a variable on (only) its growth
rate is unbalanced and yields inconsistent parameter estimates. Our CPMG state-
dependent panel model, in contrast, is applicable even in the presence of unit roots.
Thus our ﬁndings in this section that both HDI and GDP converge conditionally to
state-dependent development paths, with HDI adjustment signiﬁcantly more drawn-
out than GDP adjustment, should be taken at face value. In Section 2, we had also
appeared to have found evidence that long-run levels development of HDI is quite
closely aligned with that for GDP, but that such close alignment is not present in
growth rates, even at a 35 years horizon. These ﬁndings are consistent with the
unit root testing results as well: Two unit root processes may spuriously appear to
be correlated. A regression in ﬁrst diﬀerences may then yield seemingly diﬀerent
insights. Our CPMG state-dependent panel model points to some of the sources of
the diﬀerences in the HDI and GDP growth processes: Core macroeconomic policies
have notably diﬀerent eﬀects on HDI vs. GDP growth even at extended horizons.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have applied a novel dynamic panel model with state-dependent
coeﬃcients to study the eﬀects of a set of macroeconomic policies - investment in
physical capital, government consumption and trade openness - on the development
of HDI and GDP. In contrast to the Barro regression model framework, the CPMG
state-dependent panel model we have taken to the data does not require to a priori
impose a decomposition of the data into short- and long-run dynamics, is able to
account for potential endogeneity of the policy variables, allows for a high degree
21of cross-country heterogeneity in the development process, and is able to assess the
quantitative role of countries’ persistent characteristics such as governance quality
and gender inequality. Among the key insights that have emerged from our analysis
are: First, HDI development on various counts diﬀers notably from that of GDP.
While both HDI and GDP exhibit conditional cross-country convergence properties,
the HDI adjustment process is slower than that for GDP. Realizing gains in HDI
development requires more patience than is the case for GDP. Some macroeconomic
policies, in particular stimulation of investment in physical capital and government
consumption stimuli, spur GDP development (notably) more strongly than devel-
opment of HDI. While we also ﬁnd that policies aimed at increasing trade openness
spur HDI development actually more strongly than that of GDP, HDI development
policies should nevertheless look beyond the realm of GDP development policies.
Second, there are sizeable and important heterogeneities in the development eﬀects
of macroeconomic policies across countries. Cross-country diﬀerences in institutions
may translate into diﬀerences in both the transitional dynamics and the long-run
eﬀects implied by economic policy changes. Our ﬁndings in this regard underline the
fallacy of “one size ﬁts all” recipes, and highlight the importance of observing local
conditions for the formulation of promising development strategies. One key exam-
ple of this is that ﬁscal stimuli in the form of government consumption positively
aﬀect GDP in countries with low governance quality, but negatively aﬀect long-run
GDP in countries with high governance quality. The range of economic policies and
of societal characteristics (that render the development eﬀects of changes in eco-
nomic policies state dependent) we have considered in this paper has been rather
limited. This is primarily due to data limitations that can hinder estimation of the
CPMG state-dependent panel model even when a corresponding Barro regression
model can be estimated. Much work on data measurement thus remains, and some
of our other current work is in the direction of overcoming such limitations.
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24A Data for CPMG Panel Model’s Dependent and
Explanatory Variables
Data for the shares of government consumption, investment in physical capital, and
imports as well as exports are taken from the Penn World Tables Mark 6.3. Data
for GDP per capita and HDI were provided to us by UNDP from their hybrid HDI
database.
B Construction of the Conditioning State Vari-
ables
B.1 Quality of Governance
The quality of governance index is taken from Binder and Georgiadis (2010), and is
based on data on corruption, law and order, bureaucracy quality, investment proﬁle
and internal conﬂict, all drawn from the Political Risk Services Group’s International
Country Risk Guide.
B.2 Gender Inequality
Our gender inequality index is obtained on the basis of (i) the diﬀerence between
the ratio of a country’s female to male gross enrolment in primary schooling and the
cross-country grand average of this ratio and of (ii) the diﬀerence between the ratio
of female to male life expectancy and the cross-country grand average of this ratio,
with both series obtaining equal weight in index construction. The data are taken
from the World Bank (2008).
B.3 Extracting the Trend Component
To extract the trend component from each of the series for {zi,t−1}i=1,2,...,N;t=1,2,...,T,
while ensuring that the trend component remains pre-determined and thus not com-
plicating estimation of our CPMG state-dependent panel model, we
(i) keep the ﬁrst four observations zi,t−1, t = 1,2,3,4, and set t = 5;
25(ii) apply a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter to {zi0,zi1,...,zi,t−1};
(iii) extract the trend component zTR
i,t−1;
(iv) save zTR
i,t−1 and set t = t + 1;
(v) repeat steps (ii) to (iv) until t = T.
The conditioning state variable we use for estimation of our CPMG state-dependent




notation simple, while always using the trend components of the conditioning state
variables for estimation purposes, elsewhere in the paper we drop the “TR” super-
script even when referring to the trend component of {zi,t−1}.
C Half-Lifes in the Barro Regression and CPMG
State-Dependent Panel Models
C.1 Barro Regression Model
In the deterministic continuous-time Solow-Swan growth model, the rate of change
of output in per capita eﬃciency units,   yE
it = Yit/(AitLit) (with Yit denoting out-
put (GDP), Lit the size of the labor force, and Ait the level of technology), is
a decreasing function of the level of output in per capita eﬃciency units, that is
∂(˙   y
E
/  yE)/∂  yE = ∂[˙   y
E
(i,t,  yE)/  yE]/∂  yE < 0, and at the steady-state the change
is zero so that ˙   y
E
(i,t,  yE∗
i )/  yE = 0. Deﬁning yE = log(  yE) and noting that
˙   y
E
/  yE = ˙ yE, a ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation of the rate of change of output
in per capita eﬃciency units around the steady-state level   yE∗
i is given by
˙ y
E(i,t,  y




∂ ˙ yE(i,t,  yE)
∂yE(i,t)
|  yE(i,t)=  yE∗





















= (1 − e
−λt)   y
E∗
i + e
−λt   y
E(i,0). (C.2)
26Moving to a model in discrete time for which data are observable, with Ait ≡
Ai0   exp(g   t), Lit ≡ Li0   exp(n   t),   yit = Yit/Lit, and yit = log(  yit), Equation (C.2)
can be written as
T
−1   (yiT − yi0) = g + β1   [yi0 − y
∗
i − log(Ai0)], (C.3)
where β1 = −T −1 
 
1 − e−λT 
. Tacking on a stochastic disturbance term vi,31 assum-
ing log(Ai0) = π′  zi +log(A0) +ei, where zi is a vector of variables capturing pre-
dictable heterogeneity in initial technology, log(Ai0), and using the steady-state solu-















  s − β1   [log(A0) + π
′   zi] + ǫi, (C.4)
where ǫi = vi − β1   ei.32 The coeﬃcient β1 in the Barro regression model in Equa-
tion (10) is thus related to the parameter λ in an underlying Solow growth model
according to
λ = −
log(1 + T   β1)
T
. (C.5)
The parameter λ determines the half-life of deviations from a country’s steady-state,






y(i,tHL) − log(Ait) − y∗
i + log(Ait)













C.2 CPMG State-Dependent Panel Model
To derive the half-life in our CPMG state-dependent panel model, consider an au-
toregressive representation of yit, assuming for simplicity of exposition a determin-
31It may not be innocuous to additively tack on a stochastic disturbance term to the solution of
a deterministic growth model; see Binder and Pesaran (1999).
32See Rodr´ ıguez (2006) for how the eﬀects of the variables capturing predictable heterogeneity
in initial technology could enter the Barro regression model in a non-linear form.
27istic model with a ﬁrst-order lag structure,
yit = di + ρi   yi,t−1
= ρ
t









i   (yi0 − y
∗
i). (C.8)


















i and ρi = 1 + αi.
D Computation of Dynamic Multipliers in the
CPMG State-Dependent Panel Model
D.1 Barro Regression Model
Consider ﬁrst the Barro regression model in Equation (10),
T
−1   (yiT − yi0) = β0 + β1   yi0 + γ
′   xi + δ
′   zi + viT.
Neglecting any transitional dynamics, a policy change in the ℓ-th element of the




iT − yiT = T   γℓ   (  xiℓ − xiℓ), (D.1)
where   xiℓ denotes the value of the ℓ-th regressor after the policy change, and   yℓ
iT the
new long-run level of yi after the policy change. In case the dependent variable is
HDI,   yℓ
iT −yiT reﬂects the long-run level change of HDI relative to its baseline level.
In case the dependent variable is the logarithm of GDP per capita,   yℓ
iT −yiT reﬂects
the long-run percentage change of GDP per capita relative to its baseline level.
Recall that in the Barro regression model the variables in x are measured as shares
of GDP, while the variables in x in the CPMG state-dependent panel data model
are measured as per capita quantities. In order to work with comparable policy
28changes across the two models, for each country we calculate the long-run increase
in the share of xℓ in GDP implied by a ten percent increase in xℓ in the CPMG
state-dependent panel model, and use the implied change in the share of xℓ in GDP
as the policy change for the Barro regression model. Turning now to transitional
dynamics, as follows from Appendix C.1, Equation (C.3), the transition path leading
to the new long-run level of the dependent variable in the Barro regression model is
given by
yit − yi0 = (1 − e
−λt)   (  y
ℓ
iT − yi0), (D.2)
with λ = −log(1 + tβ1)/t.
D.2 CPMG State-Dependent Panel Model
Let us rewrite the CPMG state-dependent panel model in Equation (9) as
yit =  i + ϕi   t + (ρi1 + ρi2 + ... + ρip)   yi,t−1 + (̺i0 + ̺i1 + ... + ̺iq)



















  ∆xi,t−ℓ + ǫit (D.3)
=  i + ϕi   t + (αi + 1)   yi,t−1 − αi   θ









iℓ   ∆xi,t−ℓ + ǫit. (D.4)
Estimates of the slope coeﬃcients in Equation (D.4) can be used to compute esti-
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for ℓ = 1,2,...,m. Using ρik, k = 1,2,...,p, ̺ik, k = 0,1,...,q, a simulated series
{  yit} for which   xℓir = xℓir + policychange, t ≥ r, is generated, and the dynamic
multipliers for ℓ = 1,2,...,m, t = r,r +1,...,Ti, are obtained by subtracting {yit}
from {  yit}. We set policychange = 0.1 and for {xℓir} we use country i’s actual values
of lgov, linv, and lopen.
30E Figures
Figure 1: Evolution of the Moments of HDI
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Latin America and Caribbean
Africa
Note: The graphs depict the evolution of the cross-country mean, median and standard deviation of HDI for N = 87 countries for
the time period from 1970 to 2010. The upper left-hand panel plots the evolution of the mean, the upper right-hand panel plots the
evolution of the median, and the lower panel plots the evolution of the standard deviation. In each panel, the evolution of the mean,
the median, and the standard deviation is plotted for the full sample (“world”), as well as the OECD, Asian, African, and Latin
American and Caribbean countries that are part of this “world” sample.



















































































































Latin America and the Caribbean
Note: The graphs depict the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of HDI for N = 87 countries for the time period from 1970 to
2010. The upper left-hand panel plots the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of HDI for the full sample (“world”), the upper
right-hand panel plots this distribution for the OECD, the middle left-hand panel plots this distribution for the African countries,
the middle right-hand panel plots this distribution for the Asian countries, and the lower panel plots this distribution for the Latin
American and Caribbean countries that are part of this “world” sample. In each panel, the horizontal axes display the time period
and the scale for HDI, and the vertical axis displays the estimated density.
32Figure 3: Evolution of the Moments of the Logarithm of GDP per Capita
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Note: The graphs depict the evolution of the cross-country mean, median, and standard deviation of the logarithm of GDP per capita
for N = 87 countries for the time period from 1970 to 2010. See the note to Figure 1.




















































































































Latin America and the Caribbean
Note: The graphs depict the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of the logarithm of GDP per capita for N = 87 countries for
the time period from 1970 to 2010. See the note to Figure 2.
34Figure 5: Correlation Between Trends in HDI and GDP per Capita Between 1970
and 2010
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Slope Estimate (t−value) [p−value] {R
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Note: The graphs depict correlations between HDI in 2010 and the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2010 (upper left-hand panel), the
change in HDI and GDP per capita growth between 1970 and 2010 (upper right-hand panel), HDI in 1970 and the change in HDI
between 1970 and 2010 (lower left-hand panel), and the logarithm of GDP per capita in 1970 and GDP per capita growth between
1970 and 2010 (lower right-hand panel). In each panel, the dashed line shows ﬁtted values from an OLS regression of the variable
displayed on the vertical axis against the variable displayed on the horizontal axis, after controlling only for an intercept in both
variables.
35Figure 6: Country Rankings for the Quality of Governance Index in 2005
























































































Note: The graph depicts the cross-country ranking of the quality of (public sector) governance for 2005. The countries are sorted
from highest to lowest ranks of quality of governance. The length of each bar reﬂects the value of the quality of governance index in
2005.
36Figure 7: Country Rankings for the Gender Inequality Index in 2005
























































































Note: The graph depicts the cross-country ranking of gender inequality for 2005. The countries are sorted from lowest to highest
degrees of gender inequality. The length of each bar reﬂects the degree to which a country has achieved gender equality. 37Figure 8: Quality of Governance Index












































































































































Note: The graphs depict the estimated long-run multiplier functionals   θk(zi,t−1) from Equation (17) with the conditioning
index zi,t−1 being quality of governance. For each choice of the dependent variable, the graphs present two sets of results.
First, in the left column for HDI the long-run coeﬃcient functional estimates are depicted. Second, in the right column for HDI,
the long-run percentage change of HDI in response to a one basis point increase in the corresponding explanatory variable is
depicted (as the long-run coeﬃcient in case of HDI being the dependent variable does not represent an elasticity, the reported
percentage change is evaluated at each country’s initial period value of HDI). For the logarithm of GDP per capita, the left
column depicts the long-run coeﬃcient functional estimates, and the right column the long-run percentage change of GDP
per capita in response to a one percentage change in the corresponding explanatory variable. In each panel, the solid line
depicts the point estimates, and the dashed lines depict 95% conﬁdence bands. The scales in the second and fourth columns
are adjusted to be the same for the HDI and logarithm of GDP per capita graphs.
38Figure 9: Gender Inequality
HDI Logarithm of GDP per Capita

















































































































































Note: The graphs depict the estimated long-run multiplier functional   θk(zi,t−1) from Equation (17) with the conditioning
index zi,t−1 being gender inequality. Recall, that the higher the index value for gender inequality, the more successful a
country has been in moving towards gender equality. For further details, see the note to Figure 8.
39Figure 10: The Country Clusters
























































































Note: The graph depicts a scatter plot of countries’ average quality of governance scores against countries’ average gender inequality
scores. The brightness of the country codes indicates the adherence of the countries to our three country clusters.
40Figure 11: Dynamic Multipliers Across Clusters
HDI Logarithm of GDP per Capita
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lopen, lgdp : Cluster 3
Note: Each sub-panel displays the dynamic multipliers (solid lines) for a permanent ten basis points increase for a given policy
variable and given choice of the dependent variable in a given cluster. Also depicted in each sub-panel is the corresponding multiplier
(transition path) implied by the Barro regression model (starred line). For example, the upper left-hand panel depicts the dynamic
responses of HDI for all countries in Cluster 1 for a permanent ten basis points increase in government consumption expenditure as
implied by the CPMG state-dependent panel model and the Barro regression model. 41Figure 12: Cluster-Average Dynamic Multipliers
HDI Logarithm of GDP per Capita
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Note: Each sub-panel depicts the cluster average of the dynamic multipliers for the CPMG state-dependent panel model as plotted
in Figure 11. Also depicted in each sub-panel is the corresponding multiplier (transition path) implied by the Barro regression model
(starred line). For example, in the upper left-hand panel the average dynamic response for HDI of all countries in Cluster 1 (solid
line) to a permanent ten basis points increase in government consumption expenditure is graphed together with the corresponding
multiplier implied by the Barro regression model (starred line), as well as the long-run eﬀect implied by the CPMG state-dependent
panel model (dash-dot line). 42F Tables
Table 1: Countries Included
Algeria Kenya















Congo, Dem. Rep. Niger



























Note: The table lists the countries included in our sample.
43Table 2: Barro Regression with ∆hdi as Dependent Variable








































R-Squared 0.16 0.11 0.14
Implied λ 0.008 0.004 0.007
Half-Life 86 > 100 96
N 87 87 87
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses. *,** and *** in-
dicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
signiﬁcance level, respectively.
Table 3: Barro Regression with ∆lgdp as Dependent Variable










































R-Squared 0.43 0.27 0.46
Implied λ 0.012 0.006 0.014
Half-Life 57 > 100 48
N 87 87 87
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses. *,** and *** in-
dicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
signiﬁcance level, respectively.
44Table 4: Speed of Adjustment Parameters, zit: govqual
yit: hdi yit: lgdp
Country Group Mean Median H-L H-L (Months) N Mean Median H-L H-L (Months) N
All Countries -0.27 -0.24 2 26 87 -0.5 -0.48 1 12 87
OECD -0.25 -0.24 2 28 24 -0.46 -0.45 1 14 24
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.24 -0.21 3 30 24 -0.57 -0.54 1 10 24
Latin America and Caribbean -0.37 -0.3 2 18 21 -0.53 -0.5 1 11 21
Asia -0.23 -0.2 3 32 16 -0.42 -0.4 1 15 16
LDCs -0.24 -0.21 2 30 15 -0.56 -0.55 1 10 15
Note: The table reports the speed of adjustment parameter estimates,   αi, from Equation (17) for the full sample, as well as the
OECD, the Sub-Saharan African, the Latin American and Caribbean, the Asian and the Least Developed (LDCs) countries. In
the left results column of the table, the dependent variable is HDI, and in the right results column it is the logarithm of GDP
per capita. For both choices of the dependent variable, the table reports the mean and the median across countries within the
country group in question, the country group’s implied half-life (in years and months) as well as the number of countries in the
group.
Table 5: Speed of Adjustment Parameters, zit: geninq
yit: hdi yit: lgdp
Country Group Mean Median H-L H-L (Months) N Mean Median H-L H-L (Months) N
All Countries -0.28 -0.25 2 25 87 -0.51 -0.49 1 12 87
OECD -0.24 -0.2 3 30 24 -0.42 -0.4 1 15 24
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.2 -0.22 3 37 24 -0.58 -0.51 1 9 24
Latin America and Caribbean -0.37 -0.27 2 18 21 -0.53 -0.47 1 11 21
Asia -0.36 -0.38 2 18 16 -0.49 -0.43 1 12 16
LDCs -0.22 -0.25 3 33 15 -0.6 -0.53 1 9 15
Note: See the note to Table 4.
45Table 6: The Clusters
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Algeria Argentina Australia
Bangladesh Bahrain Austria
Burkina Faso Bolivia Belgium
Cameroon Botswana Canada
Congo, Dem. Rep. Brazil Denmark
Cote d’Ivoire Chile Finland
Egypt China France
Ethiopia Colombia Iceland
Ghana Congo, Republic of Ireland
India Costa Rica Italy
Iran Cyprus Japan
Liberia Dominican Republic Luxembourg
Malawi Ecuador Netherlands





Oman Indonesia United Kingdom
























govqual 0.69 0.88 1.73
geninq 0.9 1.05 1.07
Note: The table details the division of the full sample into three clusters of countries
based on their average governance quality and gender inequality scores. See also Figure
10.
46Table 7: Development Eﬀects of Policy Changes for Our Three Clusters of Countries:
20 Year Time Horizon
hdi lgdp
lgov linv lopen lgov linv lopen
Cluster 1 0.23 -1.26 1.63 1.88 2.06 -0.14
Cluster 2 0.01 -0.02 0.47 0.46 2.86 0.58
Cluster 3 -0.33 0.13 0.51 -0.90 3.74 1.03
Barro 0.00 0.19 -0.01 -0.95 2.93 0.07
Note: The table displays in the rows labelled “Cluster 1”, “Cluster 2” and “Cluster 3”
the average percentage change in HDI (the logarithm of GDP per capita) after 20 years
across all countries in a given cluster implied within the CPMG state-dependent panel
model by a ten percentage points increase in government consumption, in investment in
physical capital, and in trade openness. In the last row labelled “Barro”, we report the
corresponding eﬀects implied by the Barro regression model.
Table 8: Long-Run Development Eﬀects of Policy Changes for Our Three Clusters
of Countries
hdi lgdp
lgov linv lopen lgov linv lopen
Cluster 1 0.22 -1.10 1.62 1.75 2.40 0.02
Cluster 2 -0.04 -0.05 0.58 0.36 3.09 0.69
Cluster 3 -0.44 0.17 0.60 -0.99 4.01 1.12
Barro 0.01 1.61 -0.05 -5.50 17.56 0.31
Note: See the note to Table 7. Rather than reporting development eﬀects for a time hori-
zon of 20 years as Table 7 does, this table reports the long-run (steady state) development
eﬀects.
47Table 9: Unit Root Tests for HDI
Signiﬁcance Level: 1% 5% 10%
hdi
Augmented Dickey-Fuller 0 10 11
Maddala and Wu (1999) No No No
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) Yes Yes Yes
Pesaran (2007) No No No
Note: The table reports results for the traditional augmented Dickey-Fuller
unit root test and the panel unit root tests of Maddala and Wu (1999), Im,
Pesaran and Shin (2003) and Pesaran (2007). The augmented Dickey-Fuller
test is based on
∆yit = αi + δi   t + ρi   yi,t−1 +
pi  
k=1
φik   ∆yi,t−k + uit, (F.1)
which is estimated for each country separately. For the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test, the table reports the number of countries in the sample for which
the null of a unit root, H0 : ρi = 0, is rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
signiﬁcance levels. The three panel unit root tests are based on
∆yit = αi + δi   t + ρi   yi,t−1 +
pi  
k=1
φik   ∆yi,t−k + βi   ft + uit, (F.2)
where ft is an unobserved common factor capturing cross-sectional dependence;
βi = for the Maddala and Wu (1999) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel
unit root tests, with this restriction being relaxed for the Pesaran (2007) panel
unit root test. Pesaran (2007) in eﬀect approximates ft by cross-sectional
averages of the observables. For the panel unit root tests, the table reports
whether the null of a unit root in all countries, H0 : ρi = 0 for all i, is rejected
in favor of the alternative hypothesis, H1 : ρi < 0 for a non-zero fraction of
countries, at the 1%, 5%, and 10% signiﬁcance levels.
48Table 10: Unit Root Tests for the Logarithm of GDP per Capita
Signiﬁcance Level: 1% 5% 10%
lgdp
Augmented Dickey-Fuller 0 13 18
Maddala and Wu (1999) Yes Yes Yes
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) Yes Yes Yes
Pesaran (2007) No No No
Note: See the note to Table 9.
49